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We report a study of adventure sports (AS) professionals working in mountaineering, climbing, 15 
skiing, kayaking and mountain biking.  This paper expands work on professional judgment and 16 
decision-making.  The article examines the Pro-Active Coping (PAC) strategies used by AS coaches 17 
and leaders to manage the cognitive loads of decision-making.  A mixed methodology was employed 18 
in which a sample of participants completed a PAC Inventory and a sub-group then completed an 19 
Applied Cognitive Task Analysis to examine a typical coaching scenario.  The study determines that 20 
the participants manage their cognitive load in practice with a range of heuristics, avoidance 21 
strategies and instrumental support.  These include using their own communities of practice, 22 
anticipation of events that may cause high acute cognitive load (anticipation planning) and the 23 
development of a ‘straw-man plan’ based on anticipated environmental conditions and client abilities.  24 
That plan is subsequently modified in response to the actual conditions and client abilities as 25 
observed.  These strategies reduce the depletion of the coaches’ own cognitive resources by 26 
managing the demands throughout the coaching and leadership process.  We conclude that the 27 
coaches and leaders are aware of the extent of their cognitive resources and manage their 28 




Research in this journal has recently examined the planning and focus of coaches working in 31 
hyper-dynamic environments, a situation characterised by multiple interrelating or even 32 
unmanageable factors (Collins & Collins, 2016a, 2016b).  This situation is described as ‘a wicked 33 
mess’ by Simon, Carson and Collins (2017) and identified by Collins and Collins as causing a high 34 
cognitive load.  These loads are associated with developing the performance of individuals in 35 
continually changing and potentially risky environments.  In associated work, Collins, Carson and 36 
Collins (2016) identified meta-cognition as a key aspect of the coaching and leadership processes in 37 
general.  Simon, Collins and Collins (2017) suggest that the complexity of coaching in these contexts 38 
is a consequence of the synergies among three linked aspects of the coaching process: (1) the hyper-39 
dynamic environment, (2) the individual being coached and (3) the desired outcomes.  Consequently, 40 
coaches of AS experience high cognitive loads while simultaneously anticipating, planning and 41 
coping within this messy hyper-dynamic context while also attempting to facilitate the development 42 
of their students.  Cognitive load is the amount of information processing required to perform a given 43 
task (Reif, 2010). Cognitive load theory (Sweller, 1998) would assert that decision making would be 44 
hampered if working memory capacity is exceeded (De Jong, 2010.) The coaches are susceptible to 45 
high cognitive loads that can be acute and chronic. The coach must have the capacity to anticipate 46 
acute stressors caused by factors like an unexpected change in conditions or an emergency while also 47 
managing chronic stressors, such as anticipating the trajectory of the development of a student in a 48 
risky situation in order to assist in goal-setting, practice design and risk management.   49 
Limited investigation has been undertaken, however, into how AS coaches and leaders1 50 
manage the loads associated with developing individuals in this context.  Accordingly, our aim was 51 
to identify how AS coaches ensure that sufficient cognitive resources are available to manage the 52 
                                                 
1 For simplicity, we will refer to coaches and leaders simply as ‘coaches’ from this point. 
 
4 
chronic daily demands of coaching and the potential acute loads associated with anticipated changes 53 
to situational demands.  Furthermore, we ask how these strategies differ among coaches at different 54 
levels of qualification/experience. Finally, given the importance of increasing the number of female 55 
coaches across sport (e.g., Coaching Association of Canada, 2010), we were interested to see if any 56 
gender differences existed in this important coaching ability concomitant. 57 
Adventure Sports Coaching 58 
AS coaches work in hyper-dynamic environments and demonstrate an ability to respond and 59 
adapt to the changing needs as their students develop, the hyper-dynamic environment and the 60 
interaction of these two factors (Collins & Collins, 2016a, 2016b).  The focus of this interaction is the 61 
motivations and learning needs for the individual to achieve their desired outcomes while 62 
maintaining their safe participation.  Specifically, the coach operates in response the situation, a 63 
situational awareness, and its demands (Endsley, 2005) of the hyper-dynamic environment and the 64 
individual learner.  Consequently, the coach must be flexible, adaptive and creative.  The coach needs 65 
a range of experiences, pedagogic skills, practical skills, ability in the activity and—importantly for 66 
this paper—sufficient cognitive and meta-cognitive capacity to manage the coaching session.  These 67 
complex challenges indicate the need for an examination of the characteristics of coaches and the 68 
methods they employ to manage these cognitive loads.  Accordingly, we first present cognitive load 69 
theory, then proactive coping as a potential mechanism for managing cognitive load and self-70 
regulation to cope with the stressors of the coaching ‘mess’ (Simon et al., 2017).   71 
Cognitive Load 72 
Cognitive load theory (Swellers,1998) identifies three linked forms of cognitive load that are 73 
dependent on the capacity of the working memory; (1) intrinsic- that is inherent in the demands of 74 
the decision and can be influenced by prior knowledge; (2) extraneous- that is generated by the 75 
nature of that information, its quality and accuracy; (3)germane - generated by the processing of that 76 
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information. Intrinsic loads may be reduced by breaking down, sequencing or proceduralising 77 
information.  Extraneous loads by sense making of new material, referencing to existing schema and 78 
mental models and selection via the central executive function. Lack of clarity generates cognitive 79 
loads because of the sense making aspect rather than the generation of new schema. A focusing of the 80 
cognitive resource via the central executive towards the schema generation reduces the germane load 81 
(Chandler & Sweller, 1992). Two additional factors may also affect cognitive load in decision 82 
making. Decision fatigue; utilizing cognitive resource via repeated or complex decision making.  83 
Importantly this may effect impulsive decisions, ability to balance opposing information in ‘trade-84 
offs’, via avoidance of decisions, ego depletion and impaired self-regulation (Tierney, 2011; 85 
Baumeister,2003; Anderson, 2003). Additionally, a decision-making paradox (Triantaphyllou, 2000) 86 
may also be a factor in which too many possibilities are considered (Vohs, Baumeister, Twenge, 87 
Schmeichel, Tice, and Crocker ,2005)  88 
What is Proactive Coping? 89 
PAC stems from notions of positive psychology (Greenglass, 2009) and encompasses two 90 
future-oriented aspects of self-regulatory behaviour (Sohl & Moyer, 2009): resource accumulation 91 
(pinpointing what is required for success) and preventive coping.  These aspects include the use of 92 
resources, future appraisal, realistic goal-setting and intrinsic and extrinsic feedback.  PAC is a 93 
multidimensional process that occurs over time and has four elements: internal control (suggesting 94 
aspects of emotional intelligence and a meta-cognitive capacity), planning (suggesting experience 95 
and capacity to anticipate), reflection (a capacity to learn from experiences) and self-regulation of 96 
internal resources and social support (a community of practice) (Greenglass, 2002).  PAC strategies 97 
appear to be initiated by the individual, self-determined and occur simultaneously on both cognitive 98 
and behavioural levels.  Consequently, those who can cope proactively demonstrate initiative, are 99 
active when faced with stressors and mobilise cognitive resources to manage those stressors.  100 
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Greenglass, Schwarzer, Jakuniec, Fiksenbaum, & Taubert, (1999) also suggest that individuals who 101 
employ PAC strategies take responsibility for their actions and do not engage in denial or self-blame 102 
when faced with the possibility of failure though this seems speculative and warrant further research. 103 
PAC as an aspect of self-regulation.   104 
As mentioned above, self-regulation offers a broad and generalised framework to understand 105 
an individual’s coping response and may be orchestrated across a wide range of different coping 106 
skills and strategies (Baumiester, Vohs, & Tice, 2007).  Self-regulation occurs during the 107 
performance of a task via a construct of self-imposed or selected rules (Chen & Singer, 1992) and is 108 
conceived as dependent on an internal finite resource (Baumiester, Vohs, & Tice 2007).  These 109 
depletion theories are widely accepted (Vohs, Baumeister, & Schmeichel, 2012), with researchers 110 
arguing that the resources underling self-regulation are limited and that using these resources leaves 111 
fewer resources for later.  In this respect PAC potentially acts on a meta-level to manage these finite 112 
resources by focusing cognitive efforts on the most significant or likely potential outcomes and 113 
recognising the optimal strategies for a given problem or context, see our comments regarding the 114 
central executive earlier.  This ensures a more manageable cognitive load by focusing resources for 115 
maximum potential return—a meta-level risk-versus-benefit decision.  Indeed, some authors have 116 
described self-regulation with the analogy of a muscle that can be trained and developed (Baumiester, 117 
Vohs, & Tice (2007), an idea which leads to the prospect that both self-regulation and PAC could be 118 
trainable.  Others (e.g., Efklides et al., 2002) report differences in the performance of self-regulation 119 
tasks, however, and in turn highlight that this subject is complex and requiring of further 120 
investigation.  In short, the analogy may not be as so straightforward as to simply require practice to 121 
‘train the muscle’.   122 
Anticipation and PAC.  Klein and Snowden (2011) identify and characterise anticipatory 123 
thinking as the process of recognising and preparing for difficult challenges.  Based on earlier work, 124 
Klein, Snowden and Pin (2007) identify aspects of anticipatory thinking that reflect a naturalistic 125 
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model of decision-making: for instance, pattern matching, in which the circumstances of a situation 126 
provide cues and clues that something may be amiss, and trajectory tracking, in which preparation for 127 
how events are unfolding has likely implications for identification and recognition of 128 
interdependencies and their implications in a given context, recognition primed decision making.  129 
Klein and Snowden (2011) describe anticipatory thinking as both ‘sense making’ (p. 5) and a macro-130 
cognitive process that enables the decision-maker to mentally simulate possible courses of action, 131 
evaluate the potential problems that may arise and identify possible solutions.  It appears logical, 132 
however, that anticipation must also operate at a meta-level, enabling management of the PAC 133 
strategies.  In this respect, it is a strategy of problem detection and solving that requires a ‘reframing’ 134 
of the problem and the strategies for its solution, a meta-cognitive aspect of the decision-making 135 
process. Being able to anticipate allows the coach to foresee the potential for highly acute cognitive 136 
tasks.  Such a capacity potentially enables the coach to avoid situations of high load if the cognitive 137 
resources are unavailable or have been allocated to other events. 138 
Anticipation, PAC, judgment and decision-making.   139 
Previous work has stressed the significance of judgment and decision-making (Collins & 140 
Collins, 2013, 2016a, 2016b; Collins, Collins, & Carson, 2016) in high-level coaches who specialise 141 
in AS.  We argue that judgment and decision-making in this context are consistent with a dual-142 
processes perspective on decision-making and represent a synergy of classic and naturalistic 143 
cognitive approaches.  Importantly, Collins and Collins (2013, 2015, 2016a, 2016b) argue that there 144 
are several conscious processes involved in JDM despite the apparent predominance of naturalistic 145 
(such as recognition primed decision making and heuristics) that act in addition to intuitive 146 
processes.  In short, JDM combines nested classic and naturalistic decision-making processes that 147 
vary depending on the context of the decision. Pre, including planning, and post action being 148 
predominantly CDM, but not exclusively, in nature with in-action decision making being 149 
predominantly but not exclusively NDM.  150 
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Unsurprisingly, the barriers to anticipatory thinking outlined by Klein and Snowden (2011) 151 
reflect a number of heuristic biases identified by a range of authors (Cox, 2007; Girgerenzer, Todd, & 152 
ABC Research Group, 1999; Hammond, Keeney, & Raiffa, 1999; McCammon, 2004; Plouso, 1993; 153 
Renfrew, Martin, Micklewright, & St Clair Gibson, 2014; Russo & Schoemaker, 1989; Gregg, 154 
Hahadevan, & Sedikides, 2017).  Reflective of the synergy of CDM and NDM these are potential 155 
‘traps’ in the whole decision-making process.   156 
Consequently, and as stated earlier, our aim was to identify how AS coaches ensure sufficient 157 
cognitive resources are available to manage the chronic daily demands of coaching and the possible 158 
acute loads associated with anticipated changes to the situational demands.  Furthermore, we ask how 159 
these strategies differ among coaches. 160 
MethodIn order to reflect the sample size accurately and enable sufficient breadth and 161 
richness of the responses, a two-part mixed approach was employed that used the PAC Inventory 162 
(PCI) (Greenglass, Schwarzer, Jakuniec, Fiksenbaum, & Taubert, 1999) as a quantitative 163 
questionnaire and (2) an Applied Cognitive Task Analysis (ACTA) (Militello & Hutton, 1998) as a 164 
qualitative structured interview instrument (Teddlie & Tashakkori, 2009).  Parts 1 and 2 were both 165 
piloted and cognitive interviews undertaken (Drennan, 2003) with representative samples and 166 
reappraised prior to use.  To avoid interviewer bias, the interview was structured with open-ended 167 
questions to engage participants and elicit open-ended, rich and deep responses (Frey & Fontana, 168 
2005; Patton, 2002).  The small potential sample of suitably expert coaches influenced our choice of 169 
a mixed approach and our choice for depth in preference to breadth of inquisition. With regard to 170 
credibility and data interpretation, the authors are both qualified and active AS coaches and leaders. 171 
Both hold a range of the high-level qualification in a range of AS, a combined experience of over 172 
sixty years in kayaking, canoeing, mountaineering and skiing. 173 
Part 1: Proactive Coping Inventory 174 
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As a starting point, we hypothesised that we would see a full range of proactive coping strategies 175 
across the participants and that these may differ dependant on sex and experience. 176 
Participants.  Following institutional approval, a purposive sample of active British AS coaches 177 
(n = 65) was invited to take part in the study at professional development training conferences in the 178 
UK over the winter period 2017–18.  To ensure a sufficient level of domain expertise, experience and 179 
inherent quality in terms of participants’ self-reflective abilities, purposive sampling was employed 180 
based on the following criteria: (1) a minimum of five years’ coaching experience since senior 181 
accreditation as a coach or leader, (2) active engagement in AS coaching over that period and (3) a 182 
willingness to examine their professional practice.  Participants were clearly delineated by gender ( n= 183 
41males and n=18 females) and split into two groups based on years of experience in AS coaching (>5 184 
years low experience and < 5years high experience) 185 
Procedure.  Once consent was received, a copy of the PCI (Greenglass, Schwarzer, Jakuniec, 186 
Fiksenbaum, & Taubert, 1999) was forwarded to each coach.  The PCI comprises seven scales 187 
consisting of fifty-five items: PAC (n = 14), Reflective Coping (n = 11), Preventative Coping (n = 188 
10), Avoidance Coping (n = 3), Instrumental Support Seeking (n = 8), Emotional Support Seeking (n 189 
= 5) and Strategic Planning (n = 4).  These scales examine, on a cognitive and behavioural level, 190 
ways of coping based on resourcefulness, responsibility and vision.  Participants were asked to 191 
confidentially and anonymously complete the PCI by scoring responses to each item using a four-part 192 
Likert scoring response (1: not true at all, 2: barely true, 3: somewhat true and 4: completely true). 193 
Data processing and analysis.  Data collected from the PCI were analysed in line with the 194 
recommendation of the PCI originators (Greenglass et al., 1999), using two 2 X 7 (Sex X Factor) and 195 
(Experience X Factor) ANOVAs, with Greenhouse-Geisser adjustment used throughout.  At this 196 
point, participants were also asked whether they would be willing to participate in the ACTA part of 197 
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the research.  Six were randomly selected from those who agreed.  A mutually convenient date and 198 
time for the second stage were agreed following consent from participants.   199 
Results.  Of the participants (n=65), 96% response rate was achieved(n=63).  Four further 200 
were discarded for failing to meet the response criteria, erroneous or unclear answers.  Consequently, 201 
the final data set equates to a 94% completion rate and sample size of n = 59.  An initial descriptive 202 
analysis of those responses was completed, followed by a comparison of results between experience 203 
and gender, (Table 1.) 204 
Insert Table 1 close to this point 205 
Significant Mauchley Test results for sphericity in the data led to the use of the conservative 206 
Greenhouse-Geisser adjustments as recommended by Abdi (2010). No significant interactions were 207 
apparent in the experience values.  In the gender analysis, results demonstrated an unsurprising 208 
significant main effect for Factor (unsurprising and spurious, as the factors are evaluated with 209 
different scales) but also and of interest, a significant interaction between gender and factor 210 
(F(4.67.266) = 2.48, p < .05) albeit with a small effect size (Partial eta2 = .04).  This was followed up 211 
by a Tukey test, which showed this to be due to differences in proactive coping, instrumental support 212 
and avoidance seeking (see Table 1). 213 
Brief discussion of results for Part 1.  The lack of significant differences between 214 
participants of different experience levels may reflect an aspect of participation in AS.  Either 215 
participation in AS attracts individuals who have these characteristics or active participation 216 
encourages the development of proactive coping strategies.  We conjecture that this may be a unique 217 
aspect of coaching in this domain, namely that coping skills may be present in the coaches as a result 218 
of being independent practitioners in AS before becoming coaches.  This is an area worthy of further 219 
investigation.  Recent research (e.g., Frühauf, Hardy, Pfoestl, Hoellen, & Kopp 2017) has identified 220 
reflection and learning from experience as an integrated aspect of AS.  This may be an attribute that 221 
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transfers into coaching and leadership. 222 
The gender effects are also worthy of further investigation; specifically, to check whether 223 
these are genuine gender differences per se, or aspects of the social experience of the female coaches 224 
in this environment.  Constructs examined by the psychometrics used in this study are clearly 225 
important in the AS coaching role.  Accordingly, it is obviously worth examining the genesis and 226 
operation of the constructs in AS. 227 
Part 2: Applied Cognitive Task Analysis (ACTA) 228 
An ACTA (Militello & Hutton, 1998) was used to elicit the critical cognitive elements from 229 
those members of the group who agreed to participate in the second part of the study (n = 6).  The 230 
ACTA comprises a three-step process: (1) the task diagram with associated interview, (2) the 231 
knowledge audit and simulation interview and (3) a cognitive-demands table that was constructed to 232 
consolidate and synthesise the data.   233 
Participants.  Participants consisted of three female and three male coaches based in the 234 
United Kingdom (Mage = 35.4, SD = 9.47 years).  A descriptive summary of the participating coaches 235 
can be found in Table 2.  Steps were taken to ensure the anonymity of the participants, performers or 236 
other significant people involved in the study.  Pseudonyms have been used where necessary and 237 
steps have also been taken to avoid deductive disclosure. 238 
Insert Table 2 close to this point 239 
Procedure.  240 
Task diagram.  Participants were asked to consider a task diagram prior to the initial 241 
interview.  They were asked to identify the three to six major steps involved in running an AS 242 
coaching session with unknown participants in sub-optimal conditions.  The sequence in which the 243 
steps were to be carried out and those requiring greater cognitive effort are highlighted in Table 3.  244 
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The following knowledge audit took the form of a semi-structured interview focused on constructing 245 
and expanding the diagram 246 
Knowledge audit.  The knowledge audit identified how the coaches’ expertise was used.  The 247 
knowledge audit aimed to capture important aspects of the coach’s expertise and focused on 248 
knowledge categories that have been found to characterise expertise of coaching in similar contexts.  249 
These included diagnosis and prediction, situational awareness and demands, adaptability and 250 
flexibility, perceptual skills, development of and knowledge of when to apply tricks of the trade and 251 
heuristics, improvisation, meta-cognition, recognition of anomalies and compensation for equipment 252 
limitations.  Probes and questions (see Table 3) were used to elicit domain-specific knowledge or 253 
skills and further examples.  Depth was also achieved, allowing the nature of these skills, specific 254 
events and strategies to be examined.  Initial probes were followed by increasingly specific questions 255 
that examined examples, cues and strategies of decision-making.  Finally, potential errors were 256 
discussed.   257 
Insert Table 3 close to this point 258 
Simulation interviews.  The simulation interview focuses more specifically on the coach’s 259 
cognitions within the coaching process.  The stimulus scenario was selected and adapted from five 260 
possible scenarios used in AS coach training, with the same challenging scenario presented verbally 261 
to each participant.  This described a situation in which a student was failing to learn a key skill 262 
relevant to their progression and in which the coach’s regular approaches had failed.  In the scenario, 263 
the student was reported as getting frustrated and tired.  The simulation probed for situation 264 
assessment, actions, critical cues and potential errors (see Table 3).  A guide was constructed with 265 
questions influenced by critical incident technique (Flanagan, 1954) as a ‘knowledge elicitation 266 
strategy’ (Flin, O’Connor, & Crichton, 2008, p.  222).  The interviews allowed us to elicit key 267 
information and explore experiences in greater depth.  Specifically, the process involved a 268 
partnership between interviewer and interviewee, the key element of which was an exploration with 269 
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the interviewee of what information was influential when assessing a situation or selecting a 270 
particular course of action (Flin et al., 2008). 271 
Cognitive-demands table.  After conducting these three stages of the ACTA, a cognitive-272 
demands table (Table 4) was used to analyse the data and focus the analysis on the research aims and 273 
objectives.  The table provides a format that focuses analysis on the research aims by reviewing the 274 
common themes that emerge from the data derived from stages 1, 2 and 3.  We focused on difficult 275 
cognitive elements, why those aspects are difficult, the anticipation and addressing of these 276 
challenges (cues and strategies) and anticipated common errors.  The table identifies common themes 277 
in the data, connecting information and relationships.   278 
Part 2: Analysis and Results Applied Cognitive Task Analysis 279 
All participants identified the highest cognitive load as being associated with two interrelated 280 
stages in the initial context of meeting unknown students (Table 4).  The first was the decisions 281 
associated with the initial planning of the activity prior to embarking on the coaching itself, in which 282 
a venue and location were identified. This reflected the individualised focus of the whole coaching 283 
process from the outset. Second was a linked stage in which an in the field audit of the initial 284 
planning assumptions and decisions were made.  These two stages led directly to the initial coaching 285 
interactions that generated less cognitive demand.  The cognitive demand lies in the initial venue 286 
selection and consolidation of a straw-man plan, namely one that is meant to be reconfigured as 287 
information is consolidated. 288 
Insert Table 4 close to this point 289 
General Discussion  290 
Initial meeting and activity with clients.  An initial information-gathering stage prior to 291 
meeting the clients was associated with a high cognitive load.  Coaches 5 and 6 both preferred to 292 
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contact the clients in advance of any planning, whilst coaches 1, 2, 3 and 4 all started gathering 293 
information immediately prior to coaching by reviewing weather and condition forecasts and client 294 
details from booking forms.  In both approaches the process reflected the expectation of the coach’s 295 
employers; coaches 5 and 6 work within small coaching providers, while coaches 1, 2, 3 and 4 work 296 
with larger organisations and are constrained by logistical and practical demands.   297 
Irrespective of the order, this initial information-gathering stage initially appeared to be a classic 298 
decision-making process in which optimal information and time are invested in an effort to select an 299 
initial coaching venue and potential content.  Participants drew explicitly on reflection (Schön, 1983), 300 
of their own experience with potential venues in particular conditions, seeking venues that allowed 301 
for multiple options and flexibility in terms of activity and task.  Coaches 1, 2 and 6 identified the 302 
‘habitual’ use of particular venues that met these requirements  ‘I know of good venues that allow me 303 
to see what I need…’ (C6), this approach appeared to implicitly recognised a need to retain cognitive 304 
resources for later demands, though was not explicitly highlighted by the coaches. Coaches 2 and 5 305 
identified a potential habitual and familiarity heuristic (Cox, 2007; Girgerenzer, Todd, & ABC 306 
Research Group, 1999; Hammond, Keeney, & Raiffa, 1999; McCammon, 2004; Plouso, 1993; 307 
Renfrew, Martin, Micklewright, & St Clair Gibson, 2014; Russo & Schoemaker, 1989; Gregg, 308 
Hahadevan, & Sedikides, 2017) but recognised the potential for biases and traps with this approach; 309 
both guarded against these by recognising the potential for this occurrence and auditing the decision-310 
making process and exploiting their community of practice, a meta-cognitive aspect of the coach’s 311 
activity. Coach 4 described this venue selection stage as ‘a straw-man plan’ in which logistical 312 
aspects (transportation, lifts, shuttles etc.) could be fixed, thus reducing cognitive load at this point in 313 
the process but enabling all other aspects to be checked, challenged and reconfigured. The logistical 314 
aspects effectively became absolutes, providing a framework within which decisions about the 315 
activity and interaction with clients could be made.  This approach, however, was used to manage the 316 
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coach’s own cognitive resources in anticipation of a second, linked—but more cognitively 317 
demanding—stage: the field audit cited earlier, which formed the focus of the initial coaching 318 
session.  Implicitly, the coaches appeared to recognised the extent of and manage their own cognitive 319 
resources, , though this appear tacit in nature (Polyanni, 1958/1998; Nonaka & Takenchi, 1995) and 320 
requires further investigation.   321 
The Field Audit. The information gathered regarding weather, conditions and the self-322 
reported client abilities was used to inform venue choice and the immediate first couple of hours of 323 
coaching.  A holistic view of the client, the environment and the interaction of the two was developed 324 
and then continually refined, updated and modified throughout the coaching interaction as part of an 325 
initial field audit.  An escalating heuristic was applied to the client, see our note earlier regrading 326 
Cialdini, (2001).  Coach 3 stated that ‘the more time I spend with the clients, the more accurate my 327 
knowledge about their abilities and behaviour in the environment’. This further reduced cognitive 328 
load by reducing the options considered, some initial options are disregarded while others are 329 
reprioritised. Coaches 1 and 4 also highlighted that their abilities included responses to coaching and 330 
behaviour in the field under a range of conditions.  This reflected the coaches’ confidence in the 331 
information gathered as much as its accuracy: greater confidence for the coach in their decision-332 
making reduced cognitive demands by reducing the variables and the extent of their influence but 333 
would be clearly prone to heuristic traps. 334 
Strategies to elicit accurate information were employed by all coaches, though these did differ 335 
by coach and by case.  Coaches 3, 5 and 6 initially focused on technical ability and performance, 336 
while coaches 1, 2 and 4 initially sought indications of personal traits and pedagogic points, this 337 
appeared to reflect the background.  As a secondary focus, the attention switched, addressing the 338 
remaining points and triangulating the information to create a holistic view of the clients as both 339 
performers and learners.  The order of this aspect of the information-gathering reflected the coaches’ 340 
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own mental models of the situational demands faced in that context and anticipated contexts as the 341 
coaching process evolved.  Bar-Eli, Plessner and Rabb. (2011) comment that this may prove 342 
suboptimal because key information is missed, ignored or negated and links this this is due to a 343 
cognitive capacity constraint. However, the emerging ‘picture’ of the client and their development 344 
enhanced the coaches’ confidence in their decision-making, though this in itself may become a 345 
heuristic and prone to bias and assumption. While Cialdini, (2001) does warns against heuristics that 346 
increase cognitive effort this instance, appeared to lessen the cognitive load by reducing the inherent 347 
questioning of their decisions by accepting some fixed points and consolidating others.  These appear 348 
to be logistical but also created by the instructor based on their background as cited earlier. No 349 
heuristic was applied to the weather and conditions reports; these forecasts were updated regularly in 350 
the mid- and long-term plans, while short-term anticipation of changes in conditions and weather was 351 
based on the coach’s field observations, training and experience.  Thus, a cognitive resource was 352 
retained to address any potential acute stressors that could be generated by unanticipated changes in 353 
conditions, coach 5 described this as ‘a weather eye’ meaning a situational awareness and 354 
comprehension of the demands of the context.  The nature of this cognitive resource—whether it is a 355 
‘ring fenced’ resource, perhaps as an aspect of working memory and linked to executive function, or 356 
an additional one, retained as an ‘overdraft’ in long term memory—appears unclear and warrants 357 
further investigation. 358 
Retaining Flexibility. All the coaches anticipated deficiencies and inaccuracies in the 359 
information available at a local level.  These included, for example, the reliability of regional weather 360 
forecasts in a local context, anomalies and inconsistencies in condition reports as an effect of local 361 
weather and challenges in identifying client’s abilities as an outcome of client misrepresentation or 362 
misperception.  Consequently, the coaches used naturalistic decision-making, (Kahneman,2011, 363 
Klein, 2008, 2015) in an effort to reduce the cognitive load prompted by sub-optimal information 364 
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while also retaining flexibility.  Specifically, a conservative heuristic was applied: the less confidence 365 
the coach had in the information available, the more conservative the choice of venue.  Secondly, and 366 
relatedly, an inverse heuristic was applied in which the more uncertain or dynamic the conditions, the 367 
lower the assumed ability of the clients.  This assumption did not relate to the level of client 368 
performance but rather the durability, robustness and resilience of the client’s performance under the 369 
pressure generated by the conditions.  An anticipation of performance collapse under pressure was 370 
accommodated as an aspect of this heuristic.  Consequently, the coach’s adjustments to the task and 371 
delivery at the venue augmented the variety required in venue selection highlighted earlier.  This 372 
combination of classic and naturalistic approaches supports our earlier contention that decision-373 
making in this context is synergetic in the planning stages. We speculate, however, that such 374 
scepticism regarding weather and conditions reports may be reflective of the UK context of this study 375 
and is worthy of further investigation.  These decisions would be less demanding in situations in 376 
which weather patterns or conditions are more predictable or fixed. 377 
Use of the Community of Practice. The community of practice, in this case immediate 378 
colleagues and associates, was used to gain additional information regarding venues, seek support for 379 
decisions, a check and challenge, and reducing cognitive load by increasing the quality of the 380 
information available.  This appeared to support the notion that it is the uncertainty and paucity of 381 
information, not its amount, that generates cognitive and germane load. The point at which the degree 382 
of certainty becomes acceptable is specific to the coach, clients and context; the riskier the context, 383 
the more certainty is required.  Multiple interrelated factors are at play: for example, high coach-to-384 
client ratios (e.g., 1:8) with well-known students in benign conditions—a sheltered lake—has a lower 385 
cognitive load than a lower coach-to-client ratio (e.g., 1:2), with unknown clients in highly dynamic 386 
conditions.  This suggests that the cognitive load stems from the synergy of environmental and 387 
coaching demands (situational awareness and demands) rather than just the numbers of students 388 
involved, beyond the simple issue of reducing the span of control.  This may challenge long-held 389 
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beliefs that more advanced conditions automatically necessitate a lower client-to-coach ratio in 390 
favour of a more nuanced decision based on the student’s ability in context.  Knowledge of student 391 
ability becomes a factor, as a coach with capable and known students may be able to operate in a 392 
more advanced environment than the same coach with the same number of unknown students.  393 
Clearly, though, a logical increase in demand brought about by an increased span of control cannot 394 
be overlooked.  In short, the notions of low coach to student ratio is not as simplistic as the idea that 395 
advanced conditions equal a low ratio and is worthy of future investigation.  396 
Of interest, coaches 1, 2 and 4 were selective in their use of the community of practice.  397 
Specifically, they sought out particular sources, linking their choice to trust, empathy and relationship 398 
to the learning outcomes for their proposed activity.  As a consequence, the available CoP was 399 
largely based on professional respect and relevance to the proposed activity.  Coaches 3, 5 and 6 used 400 
an even narrower group of immediate colleagues via closer friendship links.  Interestingly, the 401 
coaches perceived the use of the CoP as a ‘sign of weakness’ (C2, C3, C5 and C6) and viewed it as a 402 
trait of less-experienced instructors, C3 highlighted a ‘potential to be sandbagged’2.  On 403 
investigation, this reflected the perceptions of a small group of respected and influential instructors 404 
whose seniority was based on experience and high levels of personal performance but not on specific 405 
pedagogic training.  As such, this was a historical issue and highlighted the ongoing transition in AS 406 
coaching from high performers becoming coaches to suitably trained professional coaches.  Coach 6 407 
articulated this transition as ‘being a rock climbing instructor or a rock climbing instructor’, 408 
describing a difference in the perception of their role.  Coach 5 described this as ‘the paddler 409 
sustaining their paddling habit by doing a bit of coaching on the side’.  This may reflect either the 410 
                                                 




professionalisation of coaching or the growth of the outdoors sector and is worthy of further 411 
investigation. 412 
Creating Wholistic Client View, Following the gathering of information, creation of a 413 
strawman plan and fixing of the logistics assures that a suitable flexible and secure location are 414 
selected.  The primary purpose of this initial activity was to complete a ‘field audit’.  Coach 1 stated:  415 
So, I'm stood there in this place that I've chosen, gone through all the process of 416 
deciding what to do and what I could do.  Getting there, what is the actual weather in 417 
front of me?  What are the people in front of me?  And then there is a kind of resilience 418 
to what is actually happening. 419 
Coach 5 stated that ‘no plan survives first contact….’, paraphrasing an old military adage.  An 420 
initial audit of the venue selection—literally, what the coach is observing at the venue against the 421 
forecasted weather and conditions—precedes any activity.  Coach 4 highlighted the significance of 422 
this literal reality check.  This was a specific point in an ongoing audit of forecast against reality.  423 
Coach 6 noted that the option is always retained to change venue, a Plan B, which will have been 424 
amongst a limited number those already considered and retained as a safe fall back that ensures some 425 
activity, security and the opportunity to audit the clients.  If weather and conditions appear as 426 
predicted, an internal, two-part question for the coach—is this as I expect and will it change as I 427 
expect?—is then applied to the clients.  Consequently, the objective of the session is to generate a 428 
‘picture’ (C1 and C4) of the client as a learner in context. 429 
Profiling performers is not new and, unsurprisingly, the coaches employed a range of 430 
observation and questioning strategies (Giblin, Farrow, Ball, & Abernethey, 2015). These appear 431 
highly individualised, both towards the performer and coach (McGarry, 2009) with coaches having 432 
preferred approaches, questions and assumptions based on their experiences and forming a set of 433 
highly personal heuristics built within the absolutes mentioned earlier.  In this respect, a synergy of 434 
classic and naturalistic decision-making was apparent.  Coach 5 described these as structured and 435 
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unstructured observation, which also applied to synergetic questions applied by the coach.  An audit 436 
is implied by coaches 2 and 4 and explicitly identified by coaches 1, 3, 5 and 6.  In short, the question 437 
‘Does the client’s perception of their ability match what the coach observes?’(C1) has clear safety 438 
and pedagogic implications.  Again, the coach asks the internalised question, ‘Is this as I expect?’, in 439 
this case regarding the behaviour of the client in response to both coaching and the environment.  440 
Understanding this aspect of a client’s behaviour has safety implications as it directly influences goal 441 
setting, venue selection, safety measures and coaching approach.  Anticipating client responses, their 442 
rate of development and their response to the environment reduces acute cognitive load by ensuring 443 
that the coach can gauge and adjust the environment and activities that that client may undertake. 444 
 Coaches 1, 2, 3, 4 and 6 described a need for holistic observation and questioning via 445 
increasingly structured activities.  The coaches’ conclusions were drawn from an appraisal of 446 
technical performance and the clients’ understanding of that performance in a range of different 447 
contexts.  Notably, however, the coaches also paid particular attention to the behaviour of the clients, 448 
their responses to questions and their body language.  Coaches 1, 2, 3 and 4 all referred to ‘the whites 449 
of their eyes’ as indications of fear.  Coaches 2, 4, 5 and 6 all looked for changes in client behaviour 450 
in the immediate, short and midterm as environments changed.  Coaches 1 and 3 identified ‘delaying 451 
tactics’ (C1) and ‘faffing’3 (C3) as strategies employed by clients prior to activity about which they 452 
felt uncertain.  Coaches 3 and 6 identified changes in performance, such as ‘shortening of paddle 453 
strokes’ (C5) or ‘reduction in stability’ on uneven terrain (C6), which both coaches attributed to 454 
increasing anxiety that was a consequence of change.  Importantly, the coaches used these 455 
observations in comparison with earlier observations in less stressful environments, although this was 456 
not explicitly articulated in the decisions about venue selection highlighted earlier. 457 
                                                 
3 ‘Faffing’: an informal term meaning spending one’s time doing a lot of things that are not important instead of the thing 
one should be doing. 
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Information gathered in the audit was used at two levels: initially, an act on (immediate safety), store 458 
for later (learning) or ignore basis, and an almost immediate secondary level that applied that created 459 
two sub-categories: namely, act, then store, in order to see a coaching and learning response.  460 
Conversely, a ‘store then act later’ could also be applied, combined with other information that could 461 
identify a root cause to a performance problem.  Two aspects appeared to be at play in this respect: 462 
(1) a triangulation of stored information and (2) a prioritising of information in relation to any safety 463 
concerns.  Coach 5 described this as ‘looking for a root cause’.  Outwardly, this approach demanded 464 
greater cognitive effort than just responding to the multiple individual signs, while addressing cause 465 
rather than each sign reduced cognitive load later in the coaching interaction, in this respect, the 466 
events of high cognitive loads—can be timed, when other demands are lower.  The coaches 467 
recognised that, by avoiding repeated and less effective interventions in favour of a single accurate 468 
intervention, the cognitive load can be managed on coach and the learner.  In this respect, it involves 469 
reducing the cognitive load by redesigning the straw-man plan and reducing and reordering the 470 
possible options. 471 
The coaches manage the demands of new and novel situations at a macro level by using a 472 
problem-solving strategy that starts with the last decision and action by the coach; if a learning 473 
impasse is encountered and is preceded by a change in task, this is the most likely cause of the 474 
problem, for example.  If, however, the impasse follows the coaches’ feedback, the coaches’ delivery 475 
of that feedback is to be examined.  Two interrelated heuristics emerge: the first based on the most 476 
probable cause drawn from the coach’s experiences and preferences and the second based on a 477 
particular response.  Such heuristics appear to illustrate the coaches’ recognition of the cumulative 478 
impact of arousal levels generated by the environment, for instance.  Implicitly, this suggests a 479 
recognition of the student’s own finite resources for coping and the effect of exceeding that capacity, 480 
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as the coaches appear to be managing both their own and their clients’ cognitive resources, a practical 481 
application of Sweller (1998) cognitive load theory 482 
A third heuristic is also at play that reflects the effect of change on the client.  If something is 483 
changed (e.g., the task, environment or actions of the client), the performance is anticipated  to 484 
decline while the client processes the change.  Coach 5, for example, reported a need for further 485 
action only when improvement was not observed after several attempts.  Coach 1 also reported 486 
making changes to the coaching of a client in advance of the anticipated need in order that learning 487 
may occur.  This suggests that learning is recognised by the coach a cognitive rather than just 488 
observable process.  With respect to the chronic cognitive load, it is managed in two ways: reducing 489 
the frequency of feedback that requires thought and observation and, as cited earlier, avoiding 490 
repeated less effective interventions, management of clients and coaches the intrinsic, extrinsic and 491 
germane cognitive loads.  Conversely, acute cognitive load may be addressed by encouraging 492 
replication of a particular skill without a longer-term learning objective.  For instance, an unexpected 493 
change in conditions may oblige a client to replicate a particular skill for safety reasons.  A simple 494 
‘show, tell and copy’ rather than consideration of a more sophisticated pedagogic approach requires 495 
the coach to match the approach with the demands of both the clients and the environment.  Matching 496 
the pedagogic approach with the desired outcome—in other words, picking the right ‘tool’ for the 497 
job—emerges as a cognitive load management strategy. 498 
On a micro level, the coaches use a combination of loose (Nicolson, 1971) or component 499 
parts, small functional units and some structural procedures in different combinations to facilitate a 500 
solution.  Existing components, units and procedures are adapted and repurposed in preference to 501 
redesigned novel solutions, thus lessening cognitive demands.  Integrated within this process is 502 
reflection in action (Schön, 1983), on the effect of the coaches’ actions and on action in order to 503 
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integrate the novel solution into the coaches’ repertoire.  Coaches 1, 2 and 5 highlighted both 504 
opportunistic and actively created chances for reflection during the activity.   505 
Limitations and Future Research 506 
Reflecting the geographic constraints and sample size, further investigation could logically 507 
examine the coping strategies from a larger and more geographically diverse sample.  We speculated 508 
earlier that two aspects of the study—(1) the scepticism of this sample regarding weather and 509 
conditions reports and (2) the increased professionalisation of coaching in this context (the use of the 510 
community of practice and perceptions of coaches’ roles)—may both be reflective of the UK context.  511 
More generally, in reporting on this sample of experts, it is logical to examine the training and 512 
development of proactive coping strategies in non-expert coaches.  Specifically, and reflecting the 513 
need for these coaches to participate alongside their students in the activity, we would also ask 514 
whether managing the cognitive demands of participation in AS may predispose coaches to 515 
integrating these demands into the coaching process.  The degree and genesis of the small but 516 
significant gender effects detected is also worthy of further investigation, especially if this aspect is 517 
shown to play a role in coaching efficacy and/or the workload imposed. Finally, reflecting the 518 
inherent risks associated with coaching in these activities, it would be useful to examine further how 519 
coaches may ring-fence cognitive resources to deal with the acute demands of potential emergencies.   520 
Conclusion 521 
What emerges from this study is management through proactive coping, rather than reduction 522 
of cognitive load by the coaches.  This may reflect the characteristics of high-level performance in 523 
this domain.  Coaches accommodate the finite nature of their own cognitive resources in order to 524 
manage the demands and take steps to ensure adequate cognitive resources are available for the 525 
anticipated peaks in demand.  We speculate that an element of those resources may be ring-fenced to 526 
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respond to the acute demands of emergencies, although this will require further investigation.  This 527 
may reflect a willingness to take tougher decisions and work harder in anticipation of greater savings 528 
later rather than easy options immediately: in short, coping with demands by managing the coaches’ 529 
resources based on the anticipated demand, which in turn derives from the coaches’ own reflections 530 
on their experience of their own professional practices.   531 
With respect to proactive coping strategies, the cognitions and behaviour of the coaches focus 532 
on their goal-setting capacity.  Primarily, this is self-regulation, driven by the goal.  The coaches have 533 
clearly established goals for their interaction with clients that focus and prioritise their actions and 534 
thus their cognitive load.  The male coaches in part 2 focused their goals around outcome, while the 535 
female coaches focused their goals around process.  We suggest that a middle-ground position 536 
appears optimal and that as coaches’ experience grows, an ability to move between process and 537 
outcome focus becomes optimum.   538 
With respect to instrumental support seeking, the coaches all used their community of 539 
practice.  Significantly, the male coaches restricted their community of practice to trusted friends and 540 
immediate colleagues, whilst the female coaches used a broader community of practice that relied on 541 
professional respect and recognition of the aims of the coaching.  All reflected on the perception of 542 
using the community of practice as a sign of weakness, which possibly reflects a historic culture 543 
within the domain that places value on personal ability at the expense of pedagogic skills.  Our own 544 
work has highlighted a middle-ground position in this regard (Collins & Collins, 2012, 2016) that 545 
still merits further investigation.  With respect to avoidance coping, the planning process, information 546 
gathering and audit act to delay or mitigate the cognitive load by virtue of reducing variables and thus 547 
complexity, which in turn reduces the number of possible options, building and developing a holistic 548 
image of the clients as learners in context.  This study has deepened our comprehension of the 549 
decision-making processes in expert coaches in this domain and illustrated a set of heuristics that are 550 
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synergistically with other decision-making processes to manage cognitive load.  We highlight the 551 
level of cognition used by experts in this domain.  The coaches acknowledge their finite cognitive 552 
resources and take steps to prioritise their use in anticipation of demand to ensure both client safety 553 
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Table 1: PCI Results 714 
 Gender Mean Std. Deviation N 
Proactive Coping Female 42.17 6.474 18 
 Male 44.73 4.410 41 
 Total 43.95 5.208 59 
Reflective Coping Female 33.61 3.550 18 
 Male 33.63 6.110 41 
 Total 33.63 5.426 59 
Strategic Planning Female 11.94 1.955 18 
 Male 11.59 2.202 41 
 Total 11.69 2.119 59 
Preventative Coping Female 27.11 3.848 18 
 Male 28.80 5.269 41 
 Total 28.29 4.910 59 
Instrumental Support Female 26.00 4.044 18 
 Male 23.85 4.783 41 
 Total 24.51 4.644 59 
 
34 
Emotional Support Female 15.44 3.989 18 
 Male 14.56 3.647 41 
 Total 14.83 3.742 59 
Avoidance-Seeking Female 7.11 2.676 18 
 Male 8.37 1.785 41 



































Table 2: ACTA participant details 745 
Coach Gender Specialism 
1 Female Alpine mountaineering 
2 Female Alpine mountaineering 
3 Male Mountaineering, white-water 
kayaking 
4 Female Mountaineering 
5 Male White-water kayaking 













Table 3: ACTA Prompts and Questions 755 
Question Guide Prompts Time 
(minutes) 
Task Diagram  
Prepare a task diagram for an 
AS activity in which the 
participants are unknown to 
the coach and the conditions 
have required selection of a 
venue from a limited range of 
possibilities 
Of the steps you have just 
identified, which require 
difficult cognitive skills? 
 
      What are they? 















Have you had experiences 
where part of the situation 









Are there ways of working 
smarter or accomplishing 
more with less that you have 
found especially useful? 
Heuristics 
Improvisation 
Tricks of the trade 
Contextual practices 
 
Job Smart 5 
Can you think of an example 
when you have improvised or 









Can you think of a time when 
you realised that you would 
need to change the way you 
were working in order to get 





Of own DM 
Meta-cognition 5 
Can you describe an instance 
when you spotted a deviation 
from the norm, or knew 








Have there been times when 
the events pointed in one 
direction, but your judgement 
told you to do something else?  
Or when you had to rely on 
experience to avoid being led 
astray? 










Simulation Interview  
A situation in which a student 
is failing to learn a key skill, 
relevant to their progression. 
The coaches’ regular 
approaches have failed and 
the student is now getting 
frustrated and tired. 
 
 
      Challenge is pedagogic, NOT 
technical 
      This should be kept to teaching 
approaches, NOT changes to 









       The coach may not be able to 
respond to this reflecting 
narrowness in pedagogic approach 
rather than declarative knowledge.  
Rate the ease of response 1_5 (1 

















Table 4: ACTA Results 768 













acting as a constraint 
 
Recognition of these as 
variables and need for audit 
in short mid and long term 
Commitment to a venue 
that does not offer the 
requisite variety 









Audit of Plan Accuracy of 
information 
Continual updating, 
adjusting of a 
Assuming clients 
perception of own skill is 
accurate 






holistic model that 
incorporates, the 
client, environment, 





Underestimate impact of 
environment 
Confirmation and expert 
halo heuristic trap 
‘Hard plan’ 
 
Synergy of CDM 
and NDM 
Information used on 
an Act, store, ignore 
basis also act then 
store and store then 
act later, prioritising 
Integration with mid 
and long term plan 









High cognitive load 
associated with 
adaptability, 




Linear single solution 
Co-linear solution with 
options for different 
procedures 
 
Process to find the 
solution 











stemming from a 
single route) 
